1. Introduction

As matters currently stand, there are two bills on lustration and decommunization in Romania waiting for modifications and further advancement to the status of Lustration Law in one case, and of Anti-Nomenklatura Law in the other. Worthy of note is that the lustration bill fights on two fronts ? both lustration and decommunization ? hence the presence of the metaphor ?lustration with two heads? in the title. The second part of the title refers to the broader context in which the battle for lustration/decommunization is fought in Romania. This context is the multiplication of the institutions accredited by groups of politicians of different party calibre as autochthonous ?truth revelation/investigation commissions.? Last year's clash between the president and the prime minister on the topic of Communism gave rise to two ?truth investigation commissions,? a presidential commission and a governmental institute. In meantime, smaller magnetic poles on the political scene manifested their interest in bringing up ?checking commissions? of the ?truth of investigation commissions.? Others, in a defensive and preventive manner, point non-constitutionality of the still pending legislative lustration proposals, as well as their political abuse.

1.1. Hypothesis

The inquiry aims to explore the way the current debates in Romania on defining the categories of exactly which agent or collaborator fell under the disclosure and prospective lustration drives, bear upon the strength of their legal implementation. More to the point, the paper traces the evolution of the concept of ?collaborator of the Securitate as a political police? in Romania, in the legal texts and the debates that dawdled the opening of the authoritarian regime?s secret police files and the issuing of the legislative proposal on lustration.

For this purpose, it also brings forward (however in a rather tangential manner) the carrier of the homologous German concept ? the ?unofficial collaborator.? Briefly stated, what is noticed in the Romanian case regarding the supporters of the lustration drive, is lobbying for loosening the indicators that qualify somebody as collaborator. According to them, this is an imperative, if the disclosure drive is to be carried out properly. Whilst in German case, the experience with disqualification brought about the strengthening of the criteria of decreeing somebody as former collaborator, especially in cases where it could have lead to disqualification.

The paper attempts to explain the Romanian case by the fact that the disclosure drive, unlike in Germany, produced visible victims mainly among figures from the political arena. Those disclosed as former collaborators tried ? and often managed ? to prove that even though they can be regarded as collaborators of Securitate,[1] they have not committed political police acts. The distinction is important, as for the purposes of disclosure evidence is required that somebody conducted political police activities, and not solely that he had collaborated with the Securitate. Furthermore, the ?octopus phenomenon/effect? (see the discussion later on in the paper on the term taken over from Maria Łoś[2]) did nothing but amplified the echoes of any disclosure and especially of the attempts to ?feign? disclosure. From this point on, the solution envisaged is that there are no innocents in collaboration or the intent of collaboration with Securitate. The lustration drive as such is also not indifferent to the debate, given that it directly adopts the ?disclosure victims.?

But before opening the discussion on the lustration drive in Romania I will present sketchily some remarks regarding the anti-collaborator drive in the broader post-Communist context.